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INTRODUCTION
Proxy advisory firms and their influence on the proxy voting process have 
recently become the subject of great attention for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) among other constituencies.  A glance at recent proxy 
season recaps and reports, many of which devote space to discussing proxy ad-
visory firm recommendations, reveal the significance of this influence on insti-
tutional voting.  As Sagiv Edelman puts it, “proxy advisory firms exist at the 
nexus of some of the most high-profile corporate law discussions—most nota-
bly, the shareholder voting process, which has recently been the subject of 
much scholarly and legal debate.”1 The SEC has responded by announcing that 
it intends to reform the regulations, or lack thereof, surrounding proxy advisory 
firms.
Recently, the SEC issued proposed amendments to Exchange Act Rule 
14(a)-1 which would effectively codify their earlier interpretation of solicitation 
under this rule.  The proposed amendment would “condition the availability of 
certain existing exemptions from the information and filing requirements . . . for 
* J.D. Candidate May 2020, University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to 
thank Professor Adam Pritchard for his invaluable support and guidance in writing this article. 
Many thanks also to my close friends, mentors, and to Jerome.
1. Sagiv Edelman, Proxy Advisory Firms: A Guide to Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L. J.
1369, 1369 (2013).
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proxy voting advice businesses upon compliance with additional disclosures 
and procedural requirements.” 2 Furthermore, the amendments would clarify 
when a lack of disclosure of certain information in proxy voting advice com-
promises the accuracy of the advice and misleads within the meaning of the 
rule.3 The SEC believes that these extra requirements will “help ensure that in-
vestors who use proxy voting advice receive more accurate, transparent, and 
complete information on which to make their voting decisions.”4 Based on this 
proposal, it is apparent that the SEC is intent on rectifying some of the problems 
of transparency and conflicts of interest associated with proxy advisory firms.
Given the increasing influence of proxy advisory firms, the misalignment of 
incentives between proxy firms and the institutional shareholders who use 
proxy firm services is troubling.  This Note identifies inherent problems and 
concerns with proxy advisory firms and offers solutions to these issues with a 
focus on eliminating conflicts of interest.  Using Henry Hansmann’s theory of 
ownership, this Note argues that nonprofit ownership of proxy advisory firms 
eliminates both information asymmetry and conflicts of interest inherent to the 
current ownership structure.
Part I provides a brief overview of the problems and concerns associated 
with proxy advisory firms.  Part II suggests two potential solutions: that Rule 
206(4)-6 of the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 should be repealed or alterna-
tively, that nonprofit ownership through investment company associations is a 
more effective way for investment management companies to comply with their 
fiduciary duties.  Because profit incentive has created conflicts of interest that 
lead to proxy advice that may not always be in the best interest of investment 
manager clients, nonprofit ownership promotes transparency that allows parties 
who rely on the advice to make more independent decisions.  Part III argues that 
nonprofit ownership is the most viable alternative to the status quo.
PART I: FAILURES OF THE PROXY ADVISORY FIRM
The importance of shareholder voting is a universally accepted principle of 
corporate law which has been regarded as “a traditional lynchpin that . . . legit-
imizes the theoretical foundations of modern corporate structure . . . .”5 Since 
the 1940s, the SEC has intermittently used its rulemaking authority to enhance 
shareholder access to proxy voting.  For example, Exchange Act Rule 14a-8
prevents exclusion of shareholder proposals in company proxy materials to in-
crease proxy access to shareholders.  With this increased access came increased 
protection of the proxy voting process through the SEC’s 2003 passage of Rule 
2. Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Voting Advice, 84 Fed. Reg. 
66518, 66518 (proposed Nov. 5, 2019), (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Edelman, supra note 1, at 1372.
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206(4)-6 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 which expanded institutional 
investors’ fiduciary duties.
In order to improve transparency and ensure alignment between clients’ vot-
ing objectives and voting determinations, Rule 206(4)-6 requires that registered 
investment management companies disclose the policies and procedures that 
they use to determine how to vote proxies.  Rule 206(4)-6, in conjunction with 
investment manager’s fiduciary duties, created a need for a more detailed analy-
sis of the portfolio companies that institutional shareholders were invested in.  
Enter proxy advisory firms.  Two main providers—Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis—dominate the market for proxy advisory 
services. 6 These firms, as service-oriented businesses, provide proxy voting 
advice and other corporate governance solutions to their clients.  At face value, 
this seems like a cost-effective way for institutional shareholders to satisfy their 
fiduciary and statutory duties.  But there are problems inherent to the ownership 
structure and the breadth of services these firms provide.
Proxy advisory firms have substantial influence on asset managers and the 
proxy voting process.  These firms exert considerable influence because “there 
are only two major proxy advisory firms, and . . . their recommendations them-
selves are quite correlated.”7 Although many investment management compa-
nies do not give total authority to proxy advisory firms, empirical evidence sug-
gests that their recommendations are extremely influential—even to the extent 
of robo-voting.8 A study by the American Council for Capital Formation shows 
that many asset managers automatically vote in line with the recommendations 
given by ISS and Glass Lewis.9 In reality, robo-voting is almost as bad as not 
voting at all—the very problem the disclosure is intended to solve.  This influ-
ence, coupled with the conflicts associated with the current ownership of proxy 
advisory firms, has fueled calls for reform.
The ownership structure of ISS and Glass Lewis exposes some of the prob-
lems with proxy advisory firms.  Glass Lewis is owned by the Alberta Invest-
ment Management Corporation and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan while 
ISS is owned by Genstar Capital.  On the one hand, the entities which own the 
proxy advisory firms are largely motivated by profit.  On the other hand, the in-
6. Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Jessica DiNapoli, New Glass Lewis Chief to Expand Abroad 
Amid U.S. Regulatory Clamp Down, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
glasslewis-future/new-glass-lewis-chief-to-expand-abroad-amid-u-s-regulatory-clamp-down-
idUSKBN1WJ1J4 (explaining that Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis hold 97% of 
the market share for proxy advisory firms). With this in mind, this Note will focus its discussion on 
these two main providers.  
7. Chester S. Spatt, Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Failure, and Regulation (June 25, 
2019) HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2019/06/25/proxy-advisory-firms-governance-failure-and-regulation/.
8. Timothy M. Doyle, The Realities of Robo-Voting (Nov. 29, 2018) HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/29/the-realities-of-robo-
voting/; Spatt, supra note 7.
9. Doyle, supra note 8.
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stitutional shareholders are motivated to comply with their fiduciary duties to 
their clients.  Ultimately, the differing motivations between the owners of proxy 
advisory firms and institutional shareholders suggests that their interests do not 
align.  The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan’s ownership of Glass Lewis presents 
an additional conflict: labor unions generally have strong views in favor of en-
vironmental, social, and governance proxy proposals.10 For example, in its 2020 
Corporate Governance Principles and Proxy Voting Guidelines, the Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan expressed that they “encourage companies to consider 
how climate change impacts their business” and that they “typically support 
proposals requesting improved governance and oversight of [climate 
change].”11
As for-profit entities, proxy advisory firms seek to maximize their profits—
a goal that may conflict with the goals of their clients.  This conflict appears in 
the different services that proxy advisory firms provide.  In addition to voting 
advice, proxy advisory firms provide their clients a range of services.  For ex-
ample, ISS not only offers proxy voting and research services to institutional 
shareholders but also offers compensation modeling to companies and board 
members.12
These services are widely used: 70% of public companies report that they 
“consult proxy firms on executive compensation.”13 ISS offers these services to 
“help companies design and manage their corporate governance, executive 
compensation, and sustainability programs to align with company goals.”14 In 
the same way, ISS will provide voting guidance on an issuer’s executive com-
pensation.15 ISS also helps issuers model their compensation programs and as-
signs a compensation expert to help the issuer make decisions about executive 
10. Matteo Tonello, Corporate Investment in ESG Practices (Aug. 5, 2015) HARV. L. SCH. F
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/08/05/corporate-
investment-in-esg-practices/.
11. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND PROXY 
VOTING GUIDELINES 49 (2020), https://www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20940/-/bf03be90-a413-
433f-bc4a-24a266ae17bb/2020%20Corporate%20Governance%20Principles%20and%20Proxy
%20Voting%20Guidelines.pdf.
12. ISS Executive Compensation Data, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES,
https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/execcomp-analytics/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019).  
13. The Editorial Board, The Proxy Protection Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2019, 3:30 PM 
ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-proxy-protection-racket-11573417818.
14. ISS Corporate Solutions, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES,
https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/ (last visited March 20, 2020).
15. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES:
BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/
file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf (recommending voting against members of 
the Compensation Committee or full board if the company recently approved problematic compen-
sation practices).
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compensation.16 Providing these services creates a misalignment of incentives 
between proxy advisory firms, the institutional shareholders that use their ser-
vices, and the companies the proxy advisory firms rate.
This profit incentive further motivates proxy advisory firms to stir contro-
versy.  Illustrative of this conflict is Glass Lewis’s provision of recommenda-
tions on “proxy issue[s] put forward by one of its owners, encouraging its own-
ers, as well as other special-interest investors with similar agendas, to put 
forward more contentious proxy issues.”17 For example, the Alberta Investment 
Management Corporation, part owner of Glass Lewis, co-filed a shareholder 
proposal called Say on Pay in 2018.18 Encouraging owners and investors to put 
forward contentious issues reflects the incentive for Glass Lewis to stir contro-
versy in order to “increase the value of advice about proxy questions.”19 Pro-
moting these contentious issues may not be in the best interest of clients of the 
institutional shareholders who use proxy advisory services.
Despite claims that proxy advisory firms provide services based on the 
needs of their institutional clients,20 this is not entirely accurate.  Effectively, 
Rule 206(4)-6 has created a sham democracy.  Although the SEC enacted the 
rule to improve transparency, institutional shareholders simply rely on proxy 
advisory firms to do research on companies and make recommendations on how 
to vote without understanding the advisory firms’ underlying methodologies.  
Proxy voting tends to be regarded as an ancillary duty of investment manage-
ment companies relative to their duty to make investment decisions.21 Returns 
drive fund flows, not voting behavior.  Moreover, reliance on proxy advisory 
firm research is a cost-effective method for compliance with Rule 206(4)-6 be-
cause “proxy advisors lower the cost to institutional investors of voting, saving 
institutions from having to obtain and assess information in deciding how to 
vote.”22 Thus, investment management companies have both a regulatory and
financial incentive to use proxy advisory firms’ research without assessing their 
16. ISS Corporate Solutions, supra note 14 (“If an equity plan is coming up, your advisor 
will help you navigate the intricacies of the ISS Equity Plan Scorecard. They will explain the ISS 
methodology, explain how different institutional investors use different metrics, and help you pre-
pare your board to make decisions on equity compensation governance.”).
17. Spatt, supra note 7.
18. AIMCo, 2018 Annual Report, https://www.aimco.alberta.ca/2018-annual-report/pdfs/
AIMCo-AR2018.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).  
19. Spatt, supra note 7.
20. Letter from Gary Retelny, President and CEO of Institutional Shareholder Services, to 
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, https://www.issgovernance.com/
file/duediligence/20180530-iss-letter-to-senate-banking-committee-members.pdf (“Said more simp-
ly, we are an independent provider of data, analytics and voting recommendations to support our 
clients in their own decision-making.”).
21. Ike Brannon, Diminishing the Power of Proxy Advisory Firms, FORBES (Jul. 11, 2019, 
8:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2019/07/11/diminishing-the-power-of-proxy-
advisory-firms/#5babed78452c.  
22. Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 BOS. UNIV. L. R.
1459, 1466 – 67 (2019).
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methods and processes.  Due to their profit incentive, proxy advisory firms pro-
tect their proprietary information concerning research methodologies and lack 
transparency about the development of their recommendations.  Thus, an ex-
treme information asymmetry developed between these firms and the invest-
ment management companies they service.
PART II: SOLUTIONS TO THE PROXY ADVISORY CONUNDRUM
In thinking about solutions to the problems and concerns associated with 
proxy advisory firms, it is important to note that there are different constituen-
cies that use proxy advisor voting guidance.  These constituencies operate under 
different regulatory regimes.  While mutual funds and hedge funds who use 
proxy advisory services are subject to the fiduciary duties under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, pension funds are subject to fiduciary duties under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  Pension funds, 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and the like are subject to different regulatory re-
gimes and legal requirements, so they may respond differently to proposed 
changes in the regulatory regimes and ownership structures of proxy advisory 
firms.  For example, pension plans are exempt from the definition of an invest-
ment company and consequently are not subject to the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940.23 Due to this exemption, any changes to Rule 206(4)-6 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 would not necessarily impact pension funds’ reli-
ance on proxy advisory firm services.
1. Repeal Rule 206(4)-6 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Rule 206(4)-6 requirement that registered investment management 
companies disclose their policies and procedures for determining proxy votes 
should be repealed.  Although the SEC aimed to ensure alignment between cli-
ent voting objectives and investment management company voting determina-
tions, the disclosure of proxy voting has not succeeded in this goal.  The re-
quirement specifically allows for investment management companies to satisfy 
their obligation “by relying on voting policies developed by an independent, 
third party agency—such as a proxy advisor.”24 In adopting this check-the-box
approach, the SEC gave registered investment advisors an alternative to putting 
forth their own effort and resources to be more transparent with their clients.  
Given the level of competition in the investment advisor industry, firms have 
eagerly availed themselves of this option to minimize their costs.25
23. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11) (2018).
24. James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An 
Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SER., May 30, 2018, at 2.
25. See id. at 2; Suzy Waite, Annie Massa & Christopher Cannon, Asset Managers with $74 
Trillion on Brink of Historic Shakeout, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-asset-management-in-decline/.
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Repealing the Rule 206(4)-6 requirement would eliminate virtually every 
conflict of interest involving the current use of proxy advisory firms.  The de-
mand for the services of proxy advisory firms arose because the SEC required 
investment management companies to disclose their processes.26 When ISS and 
Glass Lewis developed research reports with recommended voting practices, 
investment managers had a fail-safe way to furnish the SEC and their clients 
with detailed reports on their voting process.  Returning to the regulatory status 
quo prior to Rule 206(4)-6 would reduce the demand for proxy advisory ser-
vices, thereby greatly reducing their influence over voting decisions.
If Rule 206(4)-6 were to be repealed, then investment management compa-
nies would no longer outsource research to proxy advisory firms, thereby get-
ting rid of the potential for conflicts of interest.  With no regulatory incentive to 
provide transparency to clients, investment management companies would like-
ly return to their practices prior to the passage of this regulation.
Although this proposal would effectively eliminate the shortcomings of 
proxy advisory firms, this solution is unlikely to appeal to the SEC given the 
agency’s goal of promoting informed voting.  In 2003 when the SEC adopted 
Rule 206(4)-6, the SEC stated that it designed the rule to “prevent material con-
flicts of interest from affecting the manner in which advisers vote clients’ prox-
ies.”27 It is clear that the SEC believed that by increasing investment manage-
ment companies’ transparency, this would serve as an appropriate check on any 
existing conflicts of interest.  Eliminating this rule returns things to the prior 
status quo, which leaves room for concern about transparency and voting prac-
tices of investment management companies.  A return to the pre-Rule 206(4)-6
regulatory scheme is not likely to be implemented by the SEC because of its 
commitment to proxy voting as an important tool for accountability in the capi-
tal markets.
2. Nonprofit Ownership of Proxy Advisory Firms Is a More Effective Way for 
Investment Management Companies to Comply with Their Fiduciary Duties
If the SEC is unwilling to repeal Rule 206(4)-6, nonprofit ownership of 
proxy advisory firms by investment management companies through investment 
company associations such as the Investment Company Institute is the best so-
lution to the conflicts of interest associated with proxy advisory businesses.  
This form of ownership is also a more effective way for investment manage-
ment companies to comply with their fiduciary obligations and for the SEC’s
aims for transparency to be fully realized.
In Ownership of the Firm, Henry Hansmann explores how businesses are 
organized and why enterprises are governed and owned in certain ways.  To 
summarize briefly, Hansmann argues that “efficiency will be best served if 
ownership is assigned [so] that total transaction costs for all patrons are mini-
26. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 24, at 2.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 275(2) (2013).
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mized,” which means minimizing the costs of market contracting and the costs 
of ownership.28 Hansmann identifies the factors that typically lead to higher 
costs of market contracting as: lack of effective competition with a high degree 
of market power and information asymmetry.29 The cost of ownership is influ-
enced by the ability to exercise effective control over management of the firm, 
the ability to engage in collective decision-making, and the cost of bearing the 
risk of enterprise.30
As Hansmann suggests in Ownership of the Firm, nonprofit ownership 
emerges when “there is an extreme problem of asymmetric information between 
the firm and some class of its patrons” and “the costs of exercising effective 
control over the firm are unacceptably large relative to the value of [the pa-
trons’] transactions with the firm.”31 Extreme information asymmetry and high 
costs of ownership lead to severe inefficiencies such that no class of individuals 
can be effective owners of the enterprise.32 This information asymmetry typical-
ly develops when patrons are either purchasing goods for a third party and can-
not monitor performance cost effectively or when they purchase a public good 
such that they cannot monitor how their contribution affects the service pur-
chased.33 Sometimes, however, severe problems of information asymmetry de-
velop when patrons purchase a private good or service for their own consump-
tion—as is the case with regard to proxy advisory services.
In essence, “the nonprofit form abandons any benefits of full ownership in 
favor of stricter fiduciary constraints on management.”34 In the case of proxy 
advisory firms, the profit incentives are the root cause of the information 
asymmetry problem.  Profit maximization leads proxy advisory firms to protect 
their proprietary information concerning research methodologies for proxy vot-
ing guidelines.  Full disclosure would allow other firms to enter cheaply by 
copying those methodologies.  Due to this lack of transparency, investment 
management companies are at an informational disadvantage relative to their 
supplier; all they get is the voting recommendation.  Without disclosure of the 
information or analytic approach used to make recommendations, proxy adviso-
ry firms profit from consumers making uninformed purchases.  This state of af-
fairs sits uneasily in a securities regulation regime premised on full disclosure.
Moreover, it appears that proxy advisory firms take a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to proxy voting research.  The proxy voting guidelines “[do] not directly 
distinguish how different investors, such as different types of mutual funds and 
28. Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. OF L., ECON., AND ORG. 267, 272-73 
(1988).
29. Id. at 273–75.
30. Id. at 275–80.
31. Id. at 300.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 301.
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ETFs, should vote.”35 This approach is even more apparent with the proxy re-
ports firms publish on shareholder proposals.  Each year, proxy advisory firms 
such as ISS furnish “Voting Guideline” reports for the proxy season.36 The re-
ports “provide proxy analyses and voting recommendations for common share-
holder meetings of publicly-traded U.S.-incorporated companies that are held in 
[their] institutional investor clients’ portfolios.”37 They are general recommen-
dations that come in the form of “vote against” proposals (for example, impos-
ing tenure limits on outside directors), sometimes with factors to consider to as-
sist in a voting decision.38 Thus, proxy advisory firms further profit by using the 
same approach to different situations because it is cheaper to do the same thing 
over and over than to tailor different methods for each customer.
Nonprofit ownership by investment company associations eliminates this 
information asymmetry problem.  Since the development of recommendations 
would be in the control of an organization whose interests are aligned with 
those who benefit from the service, a nonprofit proxy advisor would be free to 
disclose research methodologies and practices to its customers.  Thus, this ap-
proach would increase transparency concerning the processes and methods that 
result in voting recommendations—promoting the SEC’s underlying goal of re-
ducing material conflicts of interest.
With respect to the costs of ownership, proxy voting is a significant ex-
penditure for investment management companies. 39 Furthermore, investment 
managers have some of the same information demands with respect to proxy 
voting.  For example, mutual funds and hedge funds are particularly interested 
in information that helps them understand how different corporate policies may 
promote shareholder wealth maximization.  Given these similarities in informa-
tional demands, investment managers can efficiently and effectively organize 
collective ownership and exercise effective oversight of the proxy services.
Currently, a few investment company associations exist that provide re-
sources and otherwise advance the interests of funds and their shareholders.  
The Investment Company Institute (ICI) is one of the leading associations of 
investment management companies and has a longstanding history of providing 
research and other resources to assist members with proxy voting.40 These re-
sources consist of ICI Viewpoints Blogs, news releases, and even conferences, 
35. Spatt, supra note 7.
36. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/
file/policy/2019/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.
37. Id. at 8.
38. See, e.g., id. at 17–19.
39. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 24, at 2 (“The proxy voting process is costly and 
requires significant time, expertise, and personnel.”).
40. See ICI Resources on Proxy Voting, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
https://www.ici.org/proxy_voting (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
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among other external sources of proxy voting information.41 ICI is a 501(c)(6) 
tax-exempt organization that consists of members (e.g., mutual funds, close-end 
funds) and a board of governors elected by the membership.  As an organization 
that seeks to provide an avenue for its members to confer and consult with each 
other and governmental agencies in connection with developments in the regu-
latory scheme, it is strategically placed to offer conflict-free proxy advisory ser-
vices.
It is unclear whether ICI or other investment company associations have 
considered offering proxy advisory services as a part of their membership bene-
fits.  As noted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “[t]o compete, 
proxy advisory firms must offer comprehensive coverage . . . and use sophisti-
cated systems to provide research.”42 Since 1985, ISS has had a long-standing 
history of “working with institutional investors,” which has contributed to its 
dominance in the market.43 This dominance makes it difficult for other service 
providers to compete, as market participants are less likely to “subscribe to a 
potentially inexperienced or less-established proxy advisory firm that may not 
provide thorough coverage.”44 The startup costs associated with proxy advisory 
firms are significant.45 Each firm must develop and implement the technology 
necessary to provide services.46
Nonprofit ownership of proxy advisory businesses by investment company 
associations also implicates Hansmann’s discussion of co-operative ownership.  
From a practical standpoint, “the roles of customer-owned and nonprofit firms 
sometimes overlap.”47 The tradeoff between market failure and the cost of con-
trol is an important driver of the benefits of co-operative ownership.48 Market 
failure can appear in the form of severe information asymmetry and market 
power.49 Market contracting can be extremely expensive in the presence of 
market failures such as monopolies and information disparities.  The problems 
that spawn co-operative ownership are strikingly similar to the problems that 
spawn nonprofit ownership.  Both map onto the issues concerning the current 
ownership of proxy advisory firms.
Hansmann discusses co-operative ownership in the context of farmer-owned 
supply co-operatives.  Farm supply co-operatives can be local, regional, or na-
41. Id.
42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER 






47. Hansmann, supra note 28, at 301.
48. See id. at 272–73, 281.
49. See id. at 272.
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tional.50 These co-operatives developed as a result of monopolies in the farm 
supply business, asymmetric information, and favorable costs of ownership for 
the consumer.51 Prior to the formation of farm supply co-operatives, “the mar-
kets involved were . . . not highly competitive” and many suppliers were under 
frequent investigation for restrictive contracts related to prices and sale territo-
ries.52 Ultimately, this had the effect of making consumer ownership an effi-
cient alternative to the status quo.
Thus, “a merger of the purchasing and the selling party through ownership”
in the form of a co-operative has no distinct features from nonprofit ownership 
through investment company associations.  Fundamentally, the nonprofit and 
co-operative ownership structures both serve as useful analogues to the ways in 
which investment company association ownership rights many of the wrongs 
inherent to for-profit ownership of proxy services.
a.  An Example: Credit Unions
Credit unions provide a relevant model of the potential benefits of nonprofit 
and co-operative ownership for proxy advisory services.  As not-for-profit enti-
ties, credit unions are organizations that exist for the service of their members.53
Much like investor-owned banks, credit unions provide a variety of financial 
services, including giving loans and accepting deposits.54 The main difference 
between investor-owned banks and credit unions is the structure of ownership.  
Credit unions are co-operatives that are member owned.  Thus, credit unions are 
under the effective control of the people who use their services.  This structure 
“creates a cycle of mutual assistance” whereby “[o]ne member’s savings be-
comes another member’s loan.”55
In A Fairer Credit Card? Priceless, Ryan Bubb and Alex Kaufman explore 
the ways in which the ownership structure of credit unions has benefitted credit 
union members.56 For example, many banks increase interest rates for borrow-
ers that do not make minimum payments on time.57 Credit unions, however, 
almost never do this.58 Moreover, “credit union cards actually offer lower annu-
al fees and longer grace periods than regular credit cards.”59 Bubb and Kaufman 
50. Id. at 287.
51. See id. at 272.
52. Id. at 287.
53. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., What is a Credit Union?, MYCREDITUNION.GOV
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argue that these customer-friendly policies are a product of the co-operative 
ownership structure of credit unions.60
Most banks are for-profit entities whose investor-shareholders expect divi-
dends; by contrast, credit unions answer to their member-shareholders who are 
also customers.  In this way, credit unions are directly controlled by those who 
would use their services and thus have incentives to promote their customers’
welfare.  Like the co-operatives that Hansmann discusses, credit unions evolved 
in a market where the costs of ownership are favorable and information asym-
metry is problematic.  Banks that are investor-owned answer to their sharehold-
ers and are mainly concerned with profit maximization.  These incentives may 
lead banks toward practices which disadvantage their consumers.61 For exam-
ple, Wells Fargo recently paid fines of $575 million after federal regulators re-
vealed “Wells Fargo employees had for years opened millions of unauthorized 
bank accounts in customers’ names” to meet aggressive sales goals.62 In this 
way, the cost of market contracting is relatively high and consumers of investor-
owned bank services and credit cards end up paying higher rates than credit un-
ion members.
Retail bank customers’ interests are relatively homogenous.  As Hansmann 
suggests, the costs of ownership can be prohibitively high when patrons with 
more heterogeneous interests try to collectively own an enterprise.63 For patrons 
of retail banking services, their interests are sufficiently similar in that they seek 
to obtain the most favorable lending situations or fees when it comes to bank 
transactions or credit cards.  Thus, member ownership in the form of a credit 
union is less costly for the class of patrons transacting with banks because the 
cost of aggregating their interests is significantly lower.
Credit unions illustrate the ways in which nonprofit or co-operative owner-
ship by investment managers can help to improve proxy advisory services. Be-
cause the service will be owned and controlled by those who use and benefit 
from it, those owners are more likely to ensure that the service is well-tailored 
to their needs and fiduciary obligations.  This would also effectively solve the 
information asymmetry problem.  Those who use proxy services are also in con-
trol, thereby giving them access to the methodologies that will be used to make 
recommendations.
Moreover, credit unions have the added advantage of their tax-exemptions 
as nonprofit organizations.  As either 501(c)(1) or 501(a) exempt organizations, 
credit unions are exempt from the corporate income taxes that most other banks 
must pay, which allows them to return more profits to their members. Nonprof-
it ownership of proxy advisory services would create the same cost advantage.  
60. Id.
61. Stacy Cowley & Emily Flitter, Wells Fargo Agrees to Pay $575 Million to Resolve State 
Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/business/wells-
fargo-settlement.html.  
62. Id.
63. Hansmann, supra note 28, at 279.
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If business leagues such as the Investment Company Institute, which is a non-
profit organization comprised of investment management companies, owned 
proxy advisory services, then the tax benefits would likely make it cheaper to 
provide the service.
b.  Arguments Against Nonprofit Ownership
Although nonprofit ownership eliminates the conflicts of interests that exist 
under current ownership, elimination of the profit-incentive can reduce compe-
tition that leads to innovation.  This may be a cause for concern.  However, the 
current market—dominated by a duopoly—already stifles competition and in-
novation.  As explained previously, ISS and Glass Lewis’s large market share 
for proxy advisory services is based on their reputation and track record of 
providing comprehensive research and recommendations.64 Based on their 97% 
market share, it does not appear that ISS and Glass Lewis currently face signifi-
cant competition from other proxy advisory firms.  ISS and Glass Lewis likely 
remain dominant due to their market experience and established expertise in re-
searching and consulting.  Though it is not clear how much competition current-
ly exists in the market, changing the ownership structure of proxy advisory 
firms is unlikely to reduce the level of competition.
Furthermore, proxy advisory firms lack transparency, so it is quite possible 
that the market’s two main service providers, ISS and Glass Lewis, are already 
using similar methods to create recommendations.  If there is any innovation 
regarding research methods, users of proxy advisory services remain unaware. 
Thus, the competitive situation cannot get any worse than present.  Proxy advi-
sory firms tend to use a one-size-fits-all approach to give generic recommenda-
tions on proposals as opposed to tailoring recommendations to each individual 
client and situation.65 Given the status quo, an elimination of the profit incen-
tive would not necessarily reduce innovation.
Indeed, a shift in the form of ownership may promote innovation.  The dif-
ferent constituencies who use proxy advisory services could promote different 
research methods and processes of creating voting recommendations.  The 
needs of pension funds and mutual funds will differ in a way that might cause 
co-operatives of these groups to develop different research methods for proxy 
voting advice.  For example, the Investment Company Institute, which includes 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and the like may develop research methods that cen-
ter on shareholder wealth maximization.  At the same time, pension funds may 
develop research methods that may weigh both shareholder wealth concerns and 
ESG principles.
64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 42, at 8.
65. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES:
BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/
policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf.
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The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, an owner of Glass Lewis, already cre-
ates its own proxy voting recommendations grounded in environmental, social, 
and governance factors.66 These governance factors are a priority for the Ontar-
io Teachers’ Pension Plan and would necessitate a research methodology that 
recognizes how different proposals may hinder or push forward ESG principles.  
Mutual funds would be more likely to use a methodology that focuses on how a 
proposal may promote shareholder wealth maximization.  A shift to a nonprofit 
model could promote a diversity of perspectives that is currently lacking.
These different constituencies would be similar to the heterogeneity of in-
terests that can make cooperative ownership of services difficult.  Although a 
large mixture of differing interests can make control of an enterprise more ex-
pensive, this problem is solved if the heterogenous constituencies create sepa-
rate proxy advisory services tailored to their interests.  As opposed to increasing 
the cost of control, the different constituencies who use proxy services could 
possibly create smaller co-operatives that are more homogenous based on the 
type of fund.  Although smaller co-operatives composed of different constituen-
cies could operate their own proxy services, the problem of economies of scale 
may limit the number of co-operatives.  Given that there are only two providers 
currently, switching to a nonprofit model is unlikely to produce a smaller num-
ber of advisory services.
Another issue raised by nonprofit ownership arises from the SEC’s legal au-
thority, or lack thereof, to mandate a certain kind of ownership for proxy advi-
sors.  It is not clear whether the SEC has legal authority to mandate a specific 
form of ownership for proxy advisory services.
SEC’s regulation of credit agencies, however, may be a useful model for 
understanding the reach and limitations of the agency’s authority to mandate 
ownership structures.  Credit rating agencies, which have similar conflict of in-
terest problems, have been the subject of SEC regulation since the 1970s.  In 
1975, the SEC began recognizing credit rating agencies as Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSRO”) through its no-action letter 
process. 67 The creation of the NRSRO reveals the reach of SEC regulation.  
Although the SEC did not craft a formal definition of the term “NRSRO” until 
2006, it used a case-by-case determination of rating agencies that fell under that 
term.68 Under Exchange Act Rule 15E(a)(1)(B), the SEC requires agencies that 
apply for NRSRO status to furnish information such as, “the procedures and 
methodologies . . . [used] in determining credit ratings [and] the organizational 
66. See ONTARIO TEACHERS’ PENSION PLAN, Corporate Governance Principles and Proxy 
Voting Guidelines, (2019) https://www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20940/-/cfca9682-9368-4cf4-
96ce-fe5381d5647e/2019%20Corporate%20Governance%20Principles%20and%20Proxy%20
Voting%20Guidelines.pdf.
67. Josh Wolfson & Corinne Crawford, Lessons from the Current Financial Crisis: Should 
Credit Rating Agencies Be Re-structured?, 8 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 85, 87 (July 2010).
68. Id.
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structure of the applicant.”69 In this way, the SEC bases its determination of 
NRSRO status on criteria like form of ownership.
A similar type of determination is possible for proxy advisory firms.  To do 
this, the SEC could create a separate registration category for proxy advisory 
firms that could use a similar application process as NRSROs that reviews the 
form of ownership or weighs nonprofit ownership as a factor in favor of confer-
ring status on the proxy advisor.  Proxy advisory firms are currently eligible to 
register based on the solicitation of proxy rules in Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, but 
this registration process does not require an application to be reviewed by the 
SEC.  Any changes to the registration process for proxy advisory firms would 
have broader implications for constituencies beyond proxy advisory firms.  It is 
unclear whether this avenue is a viable way for the SEC to mandate nonprofit 
ownership, but it is worth consideration in light of the SEC’s ongoing efforts to 
regulate proxy advisory firms.
The SEC may also have the legal authority to mandate a certain form of 
ownership by conditioning exemptions from the Exchange Act Rule 14a-1(l) 
definition of solicitation on ownership status.  Unless a communication falls 
under an enumerated exemption under Exchange Act Rule 14a-2(b), it is a so-
licitation which carries with it both required disclosures and anti-fraud liability.  
The Commission’s definition of solicitation is broad and covers “a communica-
tion to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in 
the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy.”70 In a September 2019 
guidance, the SEC determined that proxy voting advice from proxy advisory 
firms was generally considered to be a solicitation.71 Although proxy advisory 
firms have consistently relied on exemptions from this definition in Exchange 
Act Rule 14a-2(b), recent proposed amendments to these rules would codify the 
September 2019 guidance and amend Rule 14a-2(b) to condition exemption of 
proxy voting advice on certain disclosures.72
Instead of conditioning exemption on disclosure, the SEC could amend the 
rules to condition exemption from the definition of solicitation on a proxy advi-
sory firm’s form of ownership as a nonprofit.  For-profit proxy advisory ser-
vices like ISS and Glass Lewis would not be prohibited, but they would be de-
nied the exemption they currently enjoy from the proxy solicitation rules.  
Realistically, the cost of complying with those rules may be prohibitive for 
those firms, which appear to be largely focused on minimizing costs.  This 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B) (1934).
70. Commission Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules 
to Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 86,271 4 (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/34-86721.pdf.
71. See id. at 9.
72. See SEC Proposes Rule Amendments to Improve Accuracy and Transparency of Proxy 
Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release 2019-231 (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2019-231.
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would be a viable avenue for the SEC to mandate nonprofit ownership through 
its existing regulatory authority over proxy solicitations.
CONCLUSION
Proxy voting is the subject of concern and debate amongst many constitu-
encies involved with the capital markets.  Although the SEC has attempted to 
solve some of the underlying conflict of interest problems associated with in-
vestment managers and proxy voting, their efforts have proved to be largely 
fruitless.  Certainly, the SEC’s aims of providing greater transparency among 
investment managers and their clients and preventing major conflicts of interest 
from materializing are commendable.  But there are more effective ways at 
reaching these ends than the approach of Rule 206(4)-6 and enhanced disclosure 
by proxy advisory firms.
Repealing Rule 206(4)-6 is an effective strategy to deal with the conflicts of 
interest that have developed with proxy advisory firms.  Rule 206(4)-6 served as 
the impetus to the rise in influence of proxy advisory firms.  Given this causal 
connection, if the SEC were to repeal this rule, then the use and the influence of 
proxy advisory firms would decrease.  However, it is not a likely strategy to be 
used by the SEC, which ultimately wants to create better transparency between 
investment managers and their clients.
Given the SEC’s resistance to abandoning Rule 206(4)-6, a more plausible 
solution is to change the ownership structure of proxy advisory firms.  Profit 
motives have created conflicts of interest attendant to current ownership of 
proxy advisory firms.  Those conflicts have undermined the proxy advisors’ le-
gitimacy.  Hansmann’s theories of nonprofit and co-operative ownership are a 
useful model for understanding the ways in which this form of ownership may 
be beneficial for proxy advisory firms.  Current ownership has created problems 
of information asymmetry, and the tax benefits inherent to nonprofits could re-
sult in more cost-effective services.  Therefore, ownership of proxy advisory 
firms by investment company associations offers advantages relative to the sta-
tus quo.
As the SEC continues to make strides toward more effective regulation of 
proxy advisory firms, it is important to consider that solutions may not neces-
sarily take the form of increased regulation and disclosure.  Rather, effective 
solutions can come in the form of alternative ownership structures with more 
aligned incentives.
